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Abstract  
The present thesis analyses the performance of the European banks in 2007-2011. 
First, brief information on the banking sector of each EU-27 country is provided. By 
the means of comparative analysis, it is, further, shown that banks, coming from 
countries less affected by the financial crisis, outperformed (in terms of ROA and 
ROE) banks coming from the worst affected countries. Additionally, panel-data and 
OLS estimation methods are employed to investigate the importance of various 
CAMEL determinants for banks' profitability. Assets quality, management ability, 
and interest earnings turn out to be strongly significant. Moreover, we report a struc-
tural change in the relationship relative to the ownership structure (foreign vs. domes-
tic-owned banks) and observe a structural time-break that occurred as the result of the 
recent financial crisis. 
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V této práci se zabýváme analýzou výkonu evropských bank v rocích 2007-2011. Na 
začátku je uvedená stručná informace o bankovních sektorech každého státu z EU-27. 
Pomocí komparativní analýzy dále ukazujeme, že banky ze států, méně ovlivněných 
finanční krizí překonaly (z hlediska ROA a ROE) banky, z více ovlivněných států. 
Kromě toho, jsou použity panel-data a ols metody odhadu pro vyšetření 
signifikantnosti různých CAMEL determinantů ziskovosti bank. Ukázalo se, že jakost 
aktiv, schopnost řízení a úrokové zisky jsou velmi signifikantní. Navíc jsme také 
postřehli strukturní změnu ve vztahu ke struktuře vlastnictví (srovnáním cizího a 
domácího vlastnictví) a strukturní časové přerušení, které vzniklo jako výsledek 
nedávné finanční krize. 
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1 Introduction  
It is widely acknowledged that banks play an integrable role in the economic system 
and that their efficiency is closely related to the economic growth. Thus, the perform-
ance of the banking sector has been always a subject of considerable concern for dif-
ferent economic agents such as investors, depositors, policy makers, and bankers 
themselves. Recently, the European banking sector has faced several challenges that 
have strongly affected banks’ profitability and could have contributed to structural 
changes in its determinants. As the result of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the effi-
ciency of the EU-27 banks decreased significantly: average profitability ratio, meas-
ured by the return on equity (ROE), had fallen to -2.7% from the average ROE in 
2008 of 4.5%. Moreover, the variance of the performance indicators has grown, sig-
nalling that the banks were not equally affected by the economic downturn. Apart 
from that, the crisis has induced bank executives and policy-makers to pay more at-
tention to the developments in the financial sector, henceforth, increasing concern 
about its stability. New regulation and supervision rules (specifically, within the 
BASEL III framework) are being implemented in order to enhance the level and qual-
ity of equity and to improve the banks’ ability to face external shocks. Meanwhile, 
realization of these measures could permanently affect fundamentals, which are be-
hind the banks’ efficiency.  
The present thesis aims at determining the factors responsible for the perfor-
mance of the European banks, focusing particularly on the period 2007-2011. Within 
the scope of the work, we aim at verifying several presumptions. Namely, whether 
the performance depends on: a) a bank’s origin and macroeconomic situation, with 
banks from highly-affected by the crisis countries performing worse than those from 
less-affected ones; b) a bank itself, i.e. its internal characteristics; c) a bank’s owner-
ship structure, with foreign-owned banks outperforming their peers. Apart from that, 
we will test, whether the 2008-2009 crisis has resulted in the structural change of the 
relationship between the banks’ profitability and its determinants. In order to verify 
the propositions, the thesis makes use of comparative and econometric (panel data) 
methods. 
The present thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 is dedicated to back-
ground information and literature review. Chapter 3 briefly describes the national 
banking sectors of 27 EU member states. Chapter 4 introduces the hypotheses, meth-
odology and provides data description. The empirical results are presented in Chapter 
5. The conclusion is found in Chapter 6.   
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2 Background information and literature 
review 
2.1 CAMEL+S Rating Parameters – the background 
It would seem improper to begin our discussion about literature overview on the 
CAMEL model without a priory explaining the meaning of this expression. Abbre-
viation “CAMEL” stands for: Capital adequacy, Assets quality, Management ability, 
Earnings profitability, and Liquidity risk. 
Evaluation of the financial institution soundness using the CAMEL rating sys-
tem dates back to the year 1979 (Federal Communications Commission, 1997). This 
rating system helped supervisory agencies to monitor bank conditions and to identify 
those who required supervisory concern. After many years of exploitation, some revi-
sions on improving the function were made, deciding so to add a sixth component to 
“CAMEL+S” pointing for the Sensitivity to market risk. This regulation became ap-
plicable in 1997. The CAMELS ratings components are assigned on a numerical 
scale from 1 indicating the strongest performance (with little or no supervisory con-
cerns) to 5 suggesting the weakest performance and bad management practices (with 
farthermost supervisory concerns) (Federal Communications Commission, 1997).  
Following the Federal Register (1997), we will provide some brief infor-
mation about each component of the CAMELS rating system adopted in the United 
States. For a more detailed explanation please refer to the above source. 
The first component, the Capital Adequacy is the minimum level and quality 
of capital, which financial institutions are expected to maintain in a way that their 
viability is not threatened by credit, market and other risks. The Asset Quality, inter 
alia, reflects the quality of all asset investments and loan portfolios, off-balance sheet 
transactions, etc. The Management Ability characterizes the capability of the finan-
cial institution executives to comply with law and regulation, to manage risks, ensure 
effectiveness of the institution's operations, while avoiding self-dealing and by dem-
onstrating willingness to serve the community needs. The next component of the 
CAMELS ratings is the Earnings Profitability. It represents not only the quantity of 
the bank’s earnings, but also its quality and moreover its stability. The Liquidity Risk 
reflects the institution's ability to maintain a sufficient level of liquidity in order to 
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meet financial obligations in a timely manner. Lastly, the Sensitivity to the market 
risk represents the capability of the management to face and control the market risk, 
which arises from changes in foreign rates, commodity prices, interest rates, etc. 
2.2 Introduction to the Basel framework 
It has been 25 years, since a common capital adequacy framework was intro-
duced in Basel, Switzerland. Nevertheless, the adoption of minimum capital require-
ments was firstly initiated in the USA and in the UK in 1981 (Jackson, et al., 1999). 
After many years of consulting and joint workshops with the G-10 countries, in 1988, 
the Basle Committee issued the “Basle Capital Accord” on Banking Supervision 
(Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988).
1
 This agreed framework was in-
tended especially for the banks that were active in the international settlements, sug-
gesting them to establish a minimum level of capital. The most important objectives 
of this framework were not only to fortify the stability and soundness of the interna-
tional banking system but also to reduce competitive inequalities, suggests the paper 
(Jackson, et al., 1999). 
Since then the accord for international regulation and supervision framework 
for banks has been significantly developed, reformed and implemented successfully 
through three Pillars of BASEL II. Nevertheless, due to the necessity of bettering the 
governance and risk management and moreover with the aim of improving the banks' 
ability to absorb external shocks, the Basle accord has been even more enhanced via 
the implementation of the new framework,  BASEL III. 
When comparing to BASEL II, the BASEL III framework surely has intro-
duced new challenges for the banking sector. Enhancing the level and quality of the 
common equity in relation to risk-weighted assets (RWAs) is an important confront 
for all the banks' profitability.  The phased in implementation is foregoing. Starting 
January 1, 2013, banks had to meet the requirements for Common Equity Tier1 of 
3.5% (from the level of 2%), Tier 1 capital of 4.5% (from the level of 4%). From 
January 1, 2014, the minimum Common Equity Tier 1 will be 4% and Tier 1 Capital 
5.5%. The increasing will proceed on January 1, 2015 (the minimum Common Equity 
Tier 1 will be 4.5% and Tier 1 Capital 6%) (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2011).  
                                                 
1
 In 1974 was established “Basle Committee” as a representative of central banks and supervisory 
authority of main industrialized countries ( Bank for International Settlements, 2009). 
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Also a new Capital Conversation Buffer is introduced as a new element in the 
framework. According to the Basel Committee on banking supervision (2011), this 
ratio is created to make sure that banks establish capital buffers outside the periods of 
stress, in order to use them in case the losses occur. Its gradual implementation (start-
ing from January 2016 with 0.625% level, 1.25% level in January 2017 and 1.875% 
level in 2018) will increase the Minimum Total Capital by 2.5% in 2019, raising it to 
10.5% level. By January 2019, all banks must have set the minimum requirement 
according to the new BASEL III framework. 
Another proposed requirement is the Countercyclical Capital Buffer consist-
ing of common capital which will range from 0% to 2.5% level. This requirement 
will be set by the judgment of national authorities. They will monitor and assess the 
credit growth. If there is a signal of excess aggregate credit growth threatening with a 
system-wide risk, they will apply the countercyclical buffer requirement. When the 
system-wide risk dissolves they will release banks from this requirement. This ratio 
will further increase the capital conversation buffer. 
Except for the changes in capital requirements, the BASEL III framework in-
troduces two important ratios on behalf of liquidity standards. The first ratio, the Li-
quidity coverage ratio will expect banks to maintain 30-day high-quality liquid assets 
starting from 1 January 2015 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013), in 
order to fund a possible stressed scenario. The second is the complementary Net sta-
ble funding ratio designed to improve the maturity structure of assets and liabilities in 
time horizon of one year (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013). 
The complete overview of the regulations and reforms, which have been in-
troduced by BASEL III, can be found in the available sources of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS).  
2.3 Empirical Literature Review 
We will begin by reviewing works that employed the ratings of CAMEL components 
as measures of banks’ performances and continue with studies, where the ratios were 
applied to broader empirical research. Lastly, we will go through study papers that 
have considered the foreign ownership issues and structural break with respect to 
time. 
 The paper of Sangmi and Nazir (2010) analyses the financial position of the 
two largest banks in the northern part of India. The authors used CAMEL parameters, 
to range banks in scale from 1 indicating a strong bank to 5 indicating a weak bank. 
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Their study used annual data for the 5-year period. The financial performance of 
these banks was measured using the ultimate earnings ratios: the return on equity 
(ROE) and the return on assets (ROA). 
 In the paper of Kosmidou and Zopounidis (2008), the authors adopt a further 
extension of the CAMEL rating system to evaluate the banks’ performances in 
Greece. This extension was constructed by Brans and Vincke (1985) and is called 
PROMETHEE
2
 method. Model applied by Kosmidou and Zopounidis (2008) uses a 
dataset of 16 cooperative banks and 14 commercial banks in Greece for the period 
2003-2004. Such observation period was chosen in order to capture the implementa-
tion of banking principles set by the Second Banking Directive in 2003. These prin-
ciples provide equal competitive conditions for all banking institutions in the Euro-
pean Union. Authors’ remarks conclude that most commercial banks try to improve 
financial ratios, increase the number of consumers and maximize their profit by being 
more competitive in the market. In all banks, especially in cooperative ones, growth 
of equity and loans was observed, and the benefit was mostly seen in the develop-
ment of the local economy. However the implementation of the principles by some 
banks was not satisfying as they showed a decrease in financial indices, which could 
be a sign of the forthcoming problems. 
 The parameters of the CAMEL model were recently used by Lakhtaria 
(2013), for a comparative analyse of three banks’ performances in India.
3
 The study 
employed only selected public banks for the period of three years 2010-2012. Re-
garding each parameter of the model, more than one ratio was used to assess the 
ranking scale. Different from the fundamental ranking method applied in the US, the 
author here limited ranking only from 1 to 3, where number one reflects the best per-
formance score. To finally reach the overall grand ranking the group rankings were 
averaged out to find that Bank of Baroda scored the best, followed by State bank of 
India and Punjab Bank. 
 Looking back to the previous studies it is quite hard to find when the CAMEL 
parameters were firstly used in an empirical research. In the working paper of 
DeYoung, et al. (1998), the authors apply an econometric technique using panels of 
quarterly data for 1,079 US national banks. They prove that private information that 
is assessed through the CAMEL rating system is useful to financial markets only 
some months after the rating exam is done.  
                                                 
2
 PROMETHÉE - Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluation 
3
 Punjab National Bank, State Bank of India and Bank of Baroda 
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 The study of Huang, et al. (2012), employs CAMEL determinants as explana-
tory variables to examine the performance of two banking groups in Taiwan, which is 
presented by the ROA ratio. Except for the first determinant (the capital adequacy), 
the authors employ two ratios for each CAMEL determinant. They also divide the 
sample into two periods, the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period, to investigate, 
whether the effect of financial determinants has changed over time. They show that 
ROA is highly related to some specific CAMEL ratios, and find out the changes due 
to the crisis. 
 The empirical study of Ongore and Kusa (2013) uses CAMEL ratios to ana-
lyse the performance of commercial banks in Kenya. Authors utilise panel data on 37 
banks for 10 years, from 2001 to 2010. They run generalised least square and apply a 
linear multiple regression model separately on three dependent variables; return on 
assets, return on equity and net interest margin. Knowing that commercial banks’ 
main goal is to increase their profitability, these dependent variables truly represent 
that objective, suggest the authors. Further on, they test for the significance of bank 
internal factors, whereas for independent variables CAMEL parameters are used, and 
bank external factors, where independent variables are GDP growth rate and inflation 
rate. Additionally, the authors investigate the effect of domestic ownership on the 
dependent variables. Except for the liquidity variable, all other variables from internal 
factors resulted significant in the three models. From external factors, GDP had a 
positive correlation with ROE but a negative correlation with NIM and ROA. Thus, 
this relationship was reported as insignificant. The other external variable, inflation, 
had a significant negative correlation with all dependent variables. The role of bank 
ownership did not reflect any significant difference on overall determinants of bank 
performance. 
 Another study finds the use of CAMEL ratios to compare the significance of 
ownership for commercial banks' results. The study of Jha and Hui (2012) separates 
27 banks in three groups according to ownership status, namely; domestic private, 
public sector and venture banks. Except for the descriptive analysis, an econometric 
multivariate regression model was used to analyse their performance. The latter 
method firstly employed both the ROA and ROE for dependent variables. As a result, 
two similar models were constructed. The prediction power of the model with the 
ROE was lower compared to the ROA variable. Therefore, the first model with the 
ROA as a dependent variable was used to further explain the model and determine 
the drivers of banks’ performance. The authors conclude that the relationship of ROA 
with the capital adequacy ratio and interest expenses to total loan and net interest 
margin proved to be negative and significant while other ratios were not significant. 
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They also found that foreign-owned banks are equally efficient to domestic private 
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3 National Banking Sectors Overview  
This chapter provides brief information about the state of the banking sector in each 
EU member country - subject of our analysis. We aim to obtain a general idea on the 
banks' performances during and after the crisis and possibly to determine country-
specific characteristics. For more detailed information please refer to the sources pro-
vided especially to the latest released report of the European Banking Federation 
(EBF, 2012) and International Monetary Fund country specific reports. 
3.1 Austria  
The large and very developing banking sector of Austria constitutes 766 credit insti-
tutions, which in 2011 summed total assets of €1,010 billion (EBF, 2012). Due to 
favourable exchange rates, loans to households in a foreign currency were given in a 
higher amount. Only after financial crisis in 2008 austere rule were initiated with the 
intention to reduce the loan volumes given in foreign currencies and at the end of 
2011 measures for ‘sustainability-boosting’ were introduced by banking regulators. 
Two significant reasons behind the later act are counted, first as an approach to sup-
port the implementation of Basel III rules in time and the second reason to improve 
the refinancing structure of bank subsidiaries. Meanwhile Austrian subsidiaries that 
operate in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, generate more profits than the 
domestic banking and hence are loaded with higher risk, especially with higher loan 
loss provisions (OENB, 2013). Notably Austrian banking sector was weakened by the 
global financial crisis and credit bubbles of CESEE countries. Some Austrian banks 
were bailed out and restructured, amongst them KommunalKredit and Hypo Group 
Alpe Adria was nationalized (IMF, 2010) (Raiffeisen Research, 2012). According to 
the Austrian national bank report (OENB, 2013), the ongoing sovereign debt prob-
lems have reflected to a weak operating performance in Austrian banks. A supervi-
sory guidance document intended for Austrian large international active banks was 
published in 2012 from the National Bank of Austria and the Financial Market Au-
thority. This guidance document consists of measures that ensure the capital buffers 
are raised and recovery plans are prepared (OENB, 2013). 
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3.2 Belgium  
Residing in the centre of Western Europe, Belgium is not only the centre of European 
institutions (having European Commission located in the centre of Brussels) but it 
also embraces the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the presence of such 
important international institutions, it is no wonder that more than four fifths of the 
banking sectors are foreign-owned. Four leading large banks in Belgium (KBC, Bel-
fius, ING Belgium and BNP Fortis) hold more than 65% of the entire banking seg-
ment. Following the EBF report (EBF, 2012), 106 banks in Belgium amount total 
assets more than €1,100 billion (values for the end year of 2011). Households and 
small enterprises lead on receiving loans. But worth mentioning could be that cus-
tomer deposits, especially households also deposit roughly half of these bank liabili-
ties. Being considerably hit by the 2008 financial crisis, three large banks have been 
supported with capital injection from the government. Due to structural changes in 
banking supervision in 2011, National Bank of Belgium took competences from Fi-
nancial Services and Market Authority in micro and macro-prudential supervision.   
3.3 Bulgaria  
The market structure of the banking sector in Bulgaria is a typical model to those of 
Central Europe countries.  10 banks share 77% of total assets which is the average 
number on the whole region (Deloitte, 2012). In 2009, Bulgarian economy faced a 
decline in GDP growth (-5.5%). After the stagnation figures of the year 2010 (0.4%), 
recovery appeared with a growth rate of 1.7% in 2011, (Deloitte, 2012). The eco-
nomic crisis affected the income of households and solvency of the firms according 
to the report analysis (ElanaTrading, 2012), however the banking sector continues to 
be liquid and well capitalised. The main concern remains on assets quality, because 
nonperforming loans continued to rise (even in 2012), (IMF, 2012). Foreign investors 
own the majority of the market share. According to the EBF report (EBF, 2012), 
there were 31 credit institutions, averaging €42.16 billion, in 2011. 
3.4 Cyprus  
Since becoming a Eurozone member state in 2008, Cyprus’ loose fiscal policies led 
the country to public debt and large fiscal deficits (IMF, 2013). Low corporate tax 
regime attracted abundant cash inflows from non-resident clients into the banking 
sector. This money incursion was used to finance large account deficits, deteriorating 
foreign investment situation. The size of banking sector got increased to eight times 
over GDP. Different from countries that also have a large banking system, total assets 
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here are rather owned 63% by domestic-owned credit institutions (commercial banks 
and cooperatives) (Stephanou, 2011). However the accumulated deep debt imbal-
ances triggered insolvency problems of the two largest banks, consequently the au-
thorities took decisive restructuring steps to resolve and recapitalise the two biggest 
banks. Financial support Fund from European Stability Mechanism, provided to re-
store the banking sector health, is expected to extend the contribution fund. Accord-
ing to the EBF (EBF, 2012), at the end of the year 2011, in Cyprus were 141 credit 
institutions counted, amounting for €134.01 billion of total assets. 
3.5 Czech Republic  
Foreign banks own more than 95% of total assets in the banking sector in the Czech 
Republic. By the end of the year 2011, total assets amounted €180.4 billion. 44 banks 
hold 99.4% of that amount of assets and only 0.6% is held by 14 credit unions (EBF, 
2012). Since merging with the EU, the number of foreign branches remarkably in-
creased, increasing so the competition for market shares. However, more than 57.5% 
of all assets is managed by the four largest banks in the Czech Republic, namely 
Česká Spořitelna, Komerčni Banka, ČSOB and UniCredit bank. Because of a good 
loan-to-deposit ratio, good level of capital adequacy, most activities in domestic cur-
rency and in the domestic market, few activities in international financial markets and 
many other reasons, the banking sector was slightly hit by the financial crisis. 
3.6 Denmark  
A number of financial institutions and their branches had apparently decreased in the 
last decade in Denmark. Meanwhile employment was more stable, following a posi-
tive average growth in assets with total amount of €1,145 billion by the end of 2011. 
More than 67% of the market is managed by the two biggest banks, specifically Nor-
dea and Danske Bank. Negative figures of return on equity have appeared in 2008 
and 2009 but they improved to 2.4% in 2010. Likewise the Czech Republic, Denmark 
also has its own national currency, but contrariwise the Danish Central Bank main-
tains a fixed exchange rate policy with the euro area. Financial enterprises in Den-
mark are monitored by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority. This authority is 
very powerful; it can even declare enterprises as incapable to manage their activity, 
concludes the EBF report (EBF, 2012). In 2008, it established the Financial Stability 
Company, with the main aim to incorporate and help enterprises which have insol-
vency problems, that is, providing the deposit Guarantee Fund. In return, this agree-
ment with Danish State and Danish banking sector, made the government profit a 
significant amount of money.  
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3.7 Estonia  
The banking system in Estonia is represented mostly by commercial banks. The mar-
ket share is evidently dominated by the four largest foreign-owned banks which are: 
Swedbank, SEB Pank (both Swedish subsidiaries), Sampo Pank (a Danish branch) 
and Nordea Pank (a Finnish branch). During the financial crisis in September 2008, 
Swedbank experienced an excessive withdrawal of deposits, around 15 percent, re-
ports the OECD, (OECD, 2011). Consequently, considered as safer banks for deposit, 
Nordea and Sampo Pank increased their market share at the deposit side, because on 
the other hand, the Swedish subsidiaries were not considered secure. However the 
liquidity problem was normalised by the central bank of Sweden. The soundness of 
the banking system is completely linked with the soundness of foreign banks that 
operate in the country. Yet, according to the OECD (OECD, 2011), Ministry of Fi-
nance, the Financial Supervision Authority and the Central Bank (Eesti Pank), were 
responsible for managing the financial crisis. In 2008, the IMF recommended them to 
act jointly with Swedish and other Baltic authorities to proceed against any financial 
risk.  Thus, the central bank of Estonia entered into an agreement with Sweden’s 
RiskBank in February 2009. The real estate market has steadily recovered, and, cur-
rently, the banking sector is well capitalised, is liquid and remains profitable accord-
ing to the consultation report of the IMF (IMF, 2013). Indicators in the EBF report 
(EBF, 2012) for the end of the year 2011, numerate 17 credit institutions with aggre-
gate assets €19.02 billion. 
3.8 Finland 
Banking sector in Finland has remained strong and stable during the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe. Loan growth to non-financial companies increased in 2011, includ-
ing housing loans to households because of low interest rates, reports the EBF, (EBF, 
2012). Total assets amount €643 billion at the end of 2011. This amount includes a 
considerable amount of derivatives and loans of credit institutions granted to euro 
area. Meanwhile in 2011, there was also a substantial increase in loans to non mone-
tary financial institutions outside Finland. In general, the growth of the balance sheet 
was faster than any other country in the euro area.  
3.9 France 
Banking sector in France comprises a large number of credit institutions. Working on 
a very sophisticated system, banks in France operate their activity in a universal 
banking model. Banks: BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, BPCE and 
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Crédit Mutuel lead the market. Following the EBF report (EBF, 2012) in 2011, 660 
credit institutions were operating in France, amounting total assets of more than 
€8,391 billion. These institutions operate under French ownership around 70%. Ac-
tivity of French banks is spread on many other countries, but also many foreign banks 
(mainly coming from the EU), same time operate in France. The banking supervisory 
is also sophisticated, accounting that separate supervisory institutions, controlling 
authorities and advisory committees operate under the Ministry of Economy. Same 
applies for legal framework for banking business; they have special commissary au-
thority's monitoring and issuing regulation and codes of conduct to assure a clear and 
concise legislation.  
3.10 Germany 
Europe’s largest economy gladdens one of the world’s most stable banking system. 
Germany’s financial sector is composed of three pillars according to the operational 
purpose and ownership (Brunner, et al., 2004). First pillar consists of the public sec-
tor banks (Landesbanken and Sparkassen) and development institutions. Second pil-
lar consists of cooperatives, and third pillar compromises commercial banks.  In 
2011, according to the EBF report (EBF, 2012), there were 1,898 credit institutions 
with total assets €8,393 billion. The ranking of the leading banks, according to the 
total assets, starts with the biggest private commercial banks (Deutsche Bank AG, 
Commerzbank AG), public sector bank (KfW Bankengruppe) followed by the coop-
erative (DZ Bank AG) and so on.
4
 Among them, on top 10 there is also listed the for-
eign-owned bank, the HypoVereinsbank which was acquired by Italian UniCredit. 
Even though German banks are meeting the minimum levels of regulatory capital, 
they are making progress in meeting leverage and liquidity ratios and raising capital 
according to the requirements of Basel III. Restructuring of Landesbanken is gradual-
ly progressing, while the outstanding balances of capital support to banks (support 
under the original Special Fund for Financial Market Stabilization mechanism) have 
remarkably decreased. Strong trade linkages with the financial market and macroeco-
nomic developments of the leading economies, like the United States, countries from 
emerging Asia and United Kingdom, have quite an influence to the German economy 
in general. Vulnerabilities of large banks, according to the IMF report (IMF, 2012) 
are as follows; they generate low profitability (and have relatively low capital quali-
ty), continue to maintain and depend on funding from the wholesale, and exhibit con-
siderable income abroad.  
                                                 
4
 Source: http://www.moneystockstycoons.com/bank-lists/germany-banks/ 
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3.11 Greece 
During the global financial crisis (2007-2009), Greek banks were adequately capital-
ised. The worsening of liquidity conditions was wind-up by the government capital 
injections and European Central Bank to ensure stability. Nevertheless, the burst of 
Greek sovereign debt crisis affected harshly the banking system in the country. De-
posits declined significantly reducing the level of capital adequacy below the mini-
mum requirement level. The worst peak of non-performing loans ratio reached up to 
14.7% in September 2011, reports the EBF (EBF, 2012). Immense capital aid came 
from Eurosystem credit and Emergency Liquidity Assistance by the Bank of Greece 
achieving a figure of €130 billion by the end of the year 2011. In the beginning of 
2012 report indicates that household could agree to deposit their money in one year 
maturity for 4.79%, while in the euro area it was 2.96%. Greek banks were still un-
dercapitalised, but their main challenge amongst others’ was to reach the capital ade-
quacy up to 10% by the end of June 2013. According to the EBF report (EBF, 2012) 
Greece has 58 credit institutions that amount total assets €476.8 billion by the end of 
2011. 
3.12 Hungary 
When the global financial crisis approached Hungary, the economic outlook had been 
already weak in the country. The GDP trough of (-6.8%) was descent in 2009. The 
government had to borrow €20 billion from IMF to prevent possible bankruptcies 
employing austerity measures (Deloitte, 2012). To balance the budget deficit, gov-
ernment amidst others introduced a new banking tax, which highly affected the per-
formance of the financial sector in general. Forint, the Hungarian currency also faced 
an enormous depreciation, affecting so the mortgage lending of households which 
estimation is usually denominated in foreign currencies. Additionally in 2010 losses 
in banking sector appeared. Except main incomes from the net interest incomes, fees 
contribute also a sizable amount of 20% in total incomes of the banking sector. Con-
centration of the assets is shared amongst 10 largest banks. Many of them are part of 
international groups. Only 4% are state owned. Return on equity in 2010 was -2.5% 
(Deloitte, 2012). The financial sector is facing unfavourable environment, because of 
the high tax burden (IMF, 2013). Non-performing loans have increased together with 
bank losses. Meanwhile, due to injections by parent banks and deleveraging process 
and reduction of liquidity risk, banks manage to keep a good capital adequacy ratio 
and be liquid. In 2011, there were 189 credit institutions amounting €114.9 billion 
total assets (EBF, 2012). 
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3.13 Ireland 
By the end of the year 2011, Ireland has counted approximately 480 total credit insti-
tutions with €1,025 billion total assets (EBF, 2012). Only 20 were domestic banks 
and building societies. Activity of remaining foreign-owned institutions goes even 
beyond Ireland, mainly to international clients. Domestic banking sector in Ireland is 
predominantly owned by the government. They compromise of building societies of 
which the largest is the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, AIB Group, Bank of Ire-
land Group and Permanent TSB Group. These banking groups are going through a 
restructuring scheme since 2010 which it results on merging into banking groups that 
amongst others have to meet loan-to-deposit target of 122.5%, reports the EBF (EBF, 
2012). Different financial services including savings, investments, payment services, 
cash-based banking services and many more are provided by the postal service, An 
Post (a state-owned operator) whereas insurance services are provided by its subsidi-
ary the One Direct. On the other hand the international financial sector provides 
widely services contribution up to 16% on overall corporate income tax in Ireland. 
3.14 Italy 
Banking sector in Italy is almost completely privatised, hence the government owns 
less than one percent of the shares. Its banking industry is large, accounts for 740 
banks (754 reported in the year 2011), 411 of them are small mutual banks, reports 
the EBF (EBF, 2012). Other entities are cooperative banks and joint stock companies 
which mostly operate in the domestic market. Foreign banks are counted to be 72. 
Total assets account to be €4,065 billion. The sovereign debt crisis in Italy has af-
fected the banking sector. The downgrade of the country’s credit rating has resulted 
in decline of wholesale funding and acceptance of higher costs from international 
funding market. Italian Minister of Economy and Finance (Grilli, 2013), during the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee meeting held on April 2013, states 
that the GDP decrease of 2.4% was affected by the fall of domestic demand. More 
rigid conditions for lending (incurred because of the growth of non-performing loans) 
led to a fall in demand for credits. In April 2013, Government has introduced a fund-
ing package to help the employment and domestic demand. These capital injections 
are expected to help the economy recover, however positive figures are not antici-
pated until the year 2014 (Grilli, 2013). 
National Banking Sectors Overview  26 
3.15 Latvia 
When Latvia joined the EU in 2004 large investments hastened economic growth and 
inflation so much that the real estate bubble was created and soon deficit on current 
account emerged. To pull out from the liquidity crisis, to Latvia was approved a Fund 
program with total financing amount of €7.5 billion, reports the IMF (IMF, 2013). 
This funding program called Stand-By Arrangement amongst others compromised 
measures to stabilise the financial sector. Hence in mid-2010, non-performing loans 
decreased remarkably. The banking sector is controlled from 20 commercial banks, 
comprising a strong presence of foreign banks. The operation model of the banks is 
divided amongst banks that work with non-resident clients and those working with 
resident clients. The latter group consists of the subsidiaries of Nordic banks and 
other foreign bank branches that operate in Latvia. According to the EBF report 
(EBF, 2012), 31 was the number of credit institutions with assets totalling €29.5 bil-
lion in 2011. The banking sector is going through a restructuring program, especially 
after the Latvijas Krājbanka and Parex Banka have lost their banking license. Accord-
ing to the IMF report (IMF, 2013), these banks were suspended because of insol-
vency problems and fraud discovery. The real GDP growth figures show that the 
country is doing well in recovering from the crisis. In 2014 euro adoption is expected 
to take place.  
3.16 Lithuania 
Banking sector in Lithuania is driven by well-capitalized and liquid foreign-owned 
banks. According to the IMF report (IMF, 2013), from the domestic sector, four 
credit institutions were liquidated in the late 2011. Third largest bank by deposits, the 
Bank Snoras, was declared bankrupt as a result of fraud and money laundering. This 
intervention resulted in the decline of underscore in effective banking supervision; 
however the threat of financial instability was notably removed. Bank of Lithuania 
now monitors the crucial banks’ loan loss provisions and applies more austere stress 
testing measures to keep the banking system healthy. At the end of 2011, the report of 
EBF (EBF, 2012) accounts 92 credit institutions with €24.7 billion assets. Adoption 
of Euro currency instead of Lithuanian Litas is expected to be implemented in 2015. 
3.17 Luxembourg 
Luxembourg is number one Europe’s leading investment fund centre providing bank-
ing services to worldwide clients. Being a small country, domestic financial market 
consist a small share in the banking sector. According to the EBF report (EBF, 2012), 
National Banking Sectors Overview  27 
total net assets of Luxembourg had decreased for 24% after the sub-prime crisis in 
2007 and stock market crisis in 2008, but because of the superior reputation very 
soon they recovered, giving unexpected positive growth figures. At the end year of 
2011, 141 credit institution summing €1,101.4 billion assets were reported by the 
EBF (EBF, 2012), moreover in March 2012, total assets weighed to €2,217.2 billion. 
3.18 Malta 
The smallest EU economy of Malta has a large financial sector, accounting for assets 
eight times GDP (IMF, 2012). According to the report of EBF (EBF, 2012), in 2011, 
financial sectors’ total assets were €51.34 billion, allocated on 26 credit institutions. 
It is divided into domestically-oriented banks and foreign-oriented banks. The first 
group consists of seven banks, four of which are subsidiaries of EU banks. The sec-
ond group is involved in non-resident business activities, for investment banking, 
money transfer, trade financing etc. Hence the market is dependent on tourism and 
trade of nonfinancial corporations (mostly foreign-owned), the economy is exposed 
to shocks and relies on FDI and EU investment funds. In general, banks are liquid, 
well capitalised, and continue to outperform. The two major domestic banks in Malta 
share 80% of total assets (Bank of Valletta and HSBC Bank Malta) (Moodys, 2004). 
3.19 Netherlands 
The banking sector in the Netherlands is dominated by four largest banks (ABN 
AMRO, ING Group, Rabobank and Fortis. These banks hold around 95% savings of 
Dutch consumers. Financial sector similar to neighbour countries is internationally 
oriented and it has benefited from external investments from European banks. Finan-
cial reforms and regulations are taking place to ensure a good flexibility and resil-
ience during the turmoil of the global economy. The 2011 report of EBF (EBF, 
2012), numerates 287 credit institutions with €2,428.7 billion total assets. 
3.20 Poland 
The banking industry in Poland is characterised by a huge number of cooperative 
banks that present only 6% of market share. Big players are commercial banks which 
are majority foreign-owned. Taking deposits and granting loans remains in high de-
mand especially for households for the purpose of buying houses. Inter alia Poland is 
an attractive place for domestic business investments crucially on big infrastructure 
projects and small medium enterprises. According to the report of EBF (EBF, 2012), 
in 2011, there were 700 credit institutions with total assets amount of €309.8 billion. 
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3.21 Portugal 
The financial sector of Portugal is characterised with mutual agricultural credit banks. 
Financial institutions did recover from the financial crisis, without the necessity of 
the bail out from the government aid package. However, this fund is being used to 
accomplish the capital requirements set by the national bank. The international bank-
ing activity is very relevant for the financial sector. The good geographical position, 
similar cultural and linguistic binding with Brazil and other countries around, make 
Portuguese banks attractive for retail and investment banking. Amid others, activity 
comes also from European countries, where most the community of immigrants live. 
The EBF report (EBF, 2012), numerates 155 credit institutions in 2011 with total 
assets €573.6 billion. 
3.22 Romania 
The banking structure in Romania is composed of banks that are majority or entirely 
state-owned, banks that are majority foreign-owned, and eight foreign branches. A 
number of 34 majority foreign-owned banks hold more than 80% of total banking 
sector assets (NBR, 2012). Austrian banks lead by 38%, followed by Greek bank's 
subsidiaries (IMF, 2012). Thanks to solid deposits and sustaining commitments to 
parent banks, the overall banking sector is well capitalised. However, the profitability 
has remained poor, because of high provision costs and stagnant credit growth. Fol-
lowing the IMF report (IMF, 2012), non-performing loans had risen up to 17% (by 
the end of June 2012) because of the loans which were given in foreign currencies 
those and to un-hedge borrowers. In 2011, the EBF reported €91.76 billion total as-
sets shared to 41 (EBF, 2012). 
3.23 Slovakia 
Subsidiary banks from Austria, Italy, Belgium and Czech Republic control the finan-
cial sector in Slovakia. Four leading banks (Slovenská sporiteľňa – member of Erste 
Bank, VUB Banka-Intesa Sanpaolo, Tatra Banka – member of Raiffeisen and CSOB-
KBC) share more than 55% of total assets in the market.
5
 In the beginning year of 
2009, Slovakia went through a short recession period, but it successfully recovered 
due to solid policies and good economic fundamentals, reports the IMF (IMF, 2012). 
Sound inter-trade connections with partners strengthen the economy, driven by lately 
enlargement of auto production in the country. Banking sector being reliant on do-
                                                 
5
 Source (Raiffeisen Research, 2012)  
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mestic deposits is profitable, liquid and well capitalised. According to the EBF report 
(EBF, 2012), in 2011, there were 31 credit institutions averaging €58.02 billion. 
3.24 Slovenia 
The total number of credit institutions in 2011 was 25, with total assets summing 
€52.35 billion (EBF, 2012). Banks clearly dominate the market in terms of total as-
sets (€48.7 billion) (BOS, 2012). In the Financial Stability Review, banks are divided 
in three groups, namely those operating under majority foreign ownership (11 banks, 
three of them are branches of foreign banks), the large and small domestic banks. 
Large domestic banks hold around 62% of the market share, following next the ma-
jority foreign-owned banks with around 29%. The financial sector has been hit very 
hard by the global financial crisis (IMF, 2012). For the last two-three years, operating 
losses in the banking sector have been reported. With weak governance in domestic 
banks, it is no doubt that the government had to inject with capital the largest banks 
controlled by the state. According the report of Slovenian central bank (BOS, 2012), 
banking system is facing a hard period (decline in total assets), total assets continued 
to decrease widely €2 billion first 10 months of 2012. The decline of household con-
sumption and gross investment has reflected in a decline in GDP (by -1.2%, in the 
second quarter of 2012). In addition demand for housing loans decreased because of 
more rigid credit standards. Capital market continues to face difficulties, character-
ised with restriction on specific equity investments, falling returns and low liquidity 
(over the first 10 months of 2012). The market capitalisation of the shares and the 
trading volume were still below the level where they have been (prior to the crisis 
2008), while bonds issued to US markets were successful. Albeit, refinancing risk is 
high, because of the downgrading on long-term sovereign debt and banks. Regarding 
the capital adequacy, the banking system overall, still meets the EU requirements 
with 11.5% in September 2012, and 10.1% Tier 1 capital ratio (BOS, 2012). Liquid-
ity pressures have been reduced by funds supported from the European Central Bank. 
However a continuous downgrading by the rating agencies would significantly 
weaken the capability of the government to recapitalise banks in need. Furthermore, 
except for the privatisation of state-owned banks, the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) mission recommends the immediate establishment of the company 
that will deal with asset management, operational crisis arrangements and ensure re-
capitalisation (IMF, 2012). 
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3.25 Spain 
Deterioration and persistence of sovereign debt crisis in the euro area affected the 
Spanish economy accumulating high fiscal imbalances. In the beginning of 2011, a 
legislation for banks was approved, a new solvency ratio introduced. To restore the 
confidence of the investors and to strengthen the financial system soundness, the 
banking sector had to overcome a restructuring and recapitalisation adjustments to 
meet the minimum required level of capital (BoES, 2011). Because of a fall in con-
sumption and investment in both private and public sector, the Spanish economy en-
tered through a second recession in late 2011 (BoES, 2012). Spanish banks’ access to 
international funding markets remains limited. The government asked for financial 
support from the ECB (in a form of a program €100 billion) in order to help banks 
that need recapitalising, and to apply measures that help boost the resilience of the 
financial system from different shocks. Shortcomings from domestic real estate 
boom-bust, and external factors contributed to the crisis for the past four years. The 
restructuring process included merging and acquisition of 50 entities into only 14 
large and medium-sized banks, not including small private banks and other non-
foreign banks. They are categorised into four groups, namely G1- large internation-
ally active banks (account 33 percent), G2 - former savings banks (17 percent), G3 - 
former savings banks that have received state support (22 percent) and G4 consisting 
of medium and small private sector banks (only 11 percent) (IMF, 2012). Banks 
dominate the financial sector which comprised of 335 credit institutions averaging 
€3,643 billion total assets in 2011 (EBF, 2012). Biggest five banks (Banco Santander, 
BBVA, Caixabank, BFA-Banks, Banco Sabadell) share more than 70 of total assets 
of the whole financial sector. The largest banks, being well capitalised and profitable 
same time, resist the economic situation very well, whereas those groups of banks 
that were more in a critical condition and needed public support have been acquired 
by the solvent entities or are further in the restructuring process. On the third review 
of the financial assistance programme for Spain, held at the end of May 2013, the 
delegation from the European Commission, the European Banking Authority and the 
European Stability Mechanism argues the following remarks about the latest situation 
in Spain. Banking sector solvency and liquidity situation improved (ECB, 2013). For 
banks having received State aid, the restructuring process is well underway they sug-
gest, regaining so the access to funding markets. In addition the volatility of corporate 
and sovereign bond yields decreased indication of further stabilising of financial 
markets. Challenges remain on correction of fiscal imbalances, decreasing unem-
ployment and many other country specific reform recommendations from the Euro-
pean Commission (EC). 
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3.26 Sweden 
The financial sector in Sweden is divided into four categories. The main group con-
sists of domestic commercial banks, dominated by four banks, namely Nordea, 
Swedbank, Handelsbanken and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken providing consumers 
with retail services in stores and online services. Listed in the second category, Dan-
ske Bank is the leading foreign bank which focuses its activity on securities, market 
and corporate banking. In the third and fourth category enter small regional savings 
banks, and respectively co-operative banks, which co-operate with the Swedbank to 
provide better solutions to its clients. The financial infrastructure as mediation of 
payment is technically very sophisticated. Many services are obtainable through 
internet means and co-operation with other enterprises such as petrol stations and 
supermarkets. At the end of 2011, 175 credit institutions with aggregate assets €1,140 
billion, reports the EBF (EBF, 2012). 
3.27 United Kingdom 
The basic financial services like payment, intermediation, risk transfer and insurance 
have been everlasting , whilst the system providing them has evolved over the past 50 
years in the UK, stress/examine Davies et al. (Davies, et al., 2010) on the bulletin 
research and analysis paper of the Bank of England (BoE). They illustrate, how fi-
nancial innovation and globalisation, have transformed the financial sector into vari-
ous banking groups according to the function and location. Banking services nowa-
days are provided by more than 300 banks and building societies in the UK (Davies, 
et al., 2010), however the four largest UK banking groups dominate the market (Bar-
clays, Lloyds Banking Group, HSBC and RBS).
6,7
 Strengthening of banks’ balance 
sheets (after the crisis) has gradually improved, thus at a slower pace (IMF, 2012). 
Largest UK banks keep core Tier 1 capital ratios above 10% which is higher than the 
average of European banks but still it is lower than the US and Asian peers. Capital 
rising from cutting off risk-weighted assets is in progress. However, the IMF report 
shows that the bank's capital level required by Basel III is 25 percent below (IMF, 
2012). In 2011, because of increased wholesale funding costs, and high impairments 
from non-UK exposures, the profitability has declined, and two large banks being 
supported by the government reported losses. Exposures of UK owned banks, to 
countries facing sovereign debt risk has been steadily reduced, thus US followed by 
                                                 
6
 Barclays, LBG and HSCB are English Clearing Banks, whilst RBS is a Scottish bank 
7
 For more detailed information about the consolidation of merging or acquisition banking groups 
please refer the source (Davies, et al., 2010). 
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France and Germany remain the top external borrowers. On the latest Financial Sta-
bility Report (BoE, 2013), the remaining risks coming from global recovery and euro 
area imbalances, are not the only concerns for the UK market participants nowadays. 
Operational risk is among them, and it includes threats coming from cyber attack.
 8
 
Measures reducing and preventing cyber risks have been a focus of attention in the 
UK recently. In 2011, number of credit institutions were counted 373, with total as-
sets €9,708 billion (EBF, 2012). 
                                                 
8
 Following the report (BoE, 2013), cyber attack refers to: when an individual or group seeks to exploit 
vulnerabilities in IT systems for financial gain or to disrupt bank services. 
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4 Hypotheses, Methodology, and Data 
Description 
4.1 Hypotheses Statement  
In the present thesis, we aim at verifying three hypotheses related to the performance 
of the European banks in 2007-2011.  
We start by checking, whether banks from countries that were highly affected 
by the financial crisis are performing worse than those from less affected countries. 
In order to accept or reject the hypothesis, we employ several comparative methods. 
For a robust closure we apply a formal statistical test. First, we find out which coun-
tries have been strongly affected by the financial crisis in 2008-2009. The GDP 
growth rate, as a complex measure of economic activity, could be used as a threshold 
variable. In order to divide countries into Less Affected (LA) and Highly Affected 
(HA) we first calculate the benchmark, which is the average GDP growth rate in 
2009-2010 for the EU-27 area as a whole. The countries are then separated into two 
groups according to their own average GDP growth rates in 2009-2010 relative to the 
benchmark. Next stage shall deal with commercial banks. Based on their country of 
origin, we divide all banks into two groups: Banks from Less Affected countries 
(BLA) and Banks from Highly Affected countries (BHA). To compare and find out 
which group has performed better during the financial crisis, we will make use of 
banks’ profitability and performance ratios, specifically, the return on average assets 
(ROAA), the return on average equity (ROAE) and the net interest margin (NIM). 
According to the wide literature, rates of return are good predictors and the best to 
interpret the performance of banks. We will use these ratios to find the individual 
bank averages for the years 2009-2010 to test our hypothesis. 
 In order to compare the means of the two groups, we perform a statistical T-
test for testing the difference of population means, in our case means of bank groups. 
We will use the Excel to calculate the T-test for two sample assuming unequal vari-
ances. We will construct our null hypothesis for three ratios as follows: 
 Null Hypothesis: μBLA – μBHA = 0 
 Alternate Hypothesis: μBLA – μBHA ≠ 0 
Where, 
μBLA – denotes the mean of return ratios for banks from Less Affected countries, and 
μBHA – denotes the mean of return ratios for banks from Highly Affected countries. 
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The T-test assumes the data to be normally distributed, and for more accurate 
results, data should not have outliers, because they might harshly affect the results. 
Having obtained the statistical results, we will discuss the rejection or approbation of 
the null hypothesis.  
The second proposition to challenge is that ownership structure of commercial 
banks matters for their performance. To test this hypothesis, we take the advantage of 
the rich and diverse dataset information provided and employ an econometric tech-
nique. Using the CAMEL ratios we run the panel model regression on an unbalanced 
panel of all commercial banks, where the maximum number of observations per bank 
will be five years, and minimum - one year. We define our model following the pre-
viously discussed approaches from the existing studies, with ROAA being the de-
pendent variable and CAMEL ratios as the explanatory variables. To investigate our 
hypothesis, we further employ the ownership information. We pertain a similar tech-
nique as in Ongore and Kusa (2013), and set the dummy variable equal to one for 
banks with more than 50.01% of foreign capital. We consequently determine, 
whether ownership structure affects the relationship between banks' performance and 
CAMEL ratios.  
The third hypothesis to be tested is whether there was a structural break in 
banks performance following the 2008-2009 financial crises. To verify this proposi-
tion, we will apply a similar approach as with the previous hypothesis. We divide the 
observations into two periods similar to the work of Huang, et al. (2012) and Ongore 
and Kusa (2013). The pre-crisis period will contain the data from the two-year period, 
2007 and 2008. The post-crisis period will comprise the observations separately for 
the years 2009 and 2010. For testing this hypothesis we will run separate regressions 
for each period and by the means of the Chow test will infer on the presence of a 
structural time-break. 
Regressions will be conducted for the all commercial banks of all 27 Euro-
pean Countries jointly. Apart from presenting the estimation results, coefficients 
signs and their significances will be analysed in more detail with more stress to the 
constant. Further explanation concerning the choice and description of the variables 
will be discussed in the following section.  
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4.2 Data  
We have focused our research on the years around the period of the financial crisis 
2007-2011). The entrance of two countries, Bulgaria and Romania, in the EU in 
2007, is also another reason and a good advantage for us to have a larger dataset in 
the analysis. Two sources for the data were used. Microdata on commercial banks 
were obtained from the Fitch’s database Bankscope Bureau Van Dijk for the years 
2007-2011.
9
 Annual real GDP growth rates for the EU-27 countries in 2009-2010 
(needed to test the first hypothesis) were retrieved from the World Bank database. 
The obtained information from both sources was arranged, tested, compiled and re-




We proceed with a more detailed description of the data from the Bankscope 
database. For the needs of testing the first hypothesis, we employed the average Re-
turn on Assets (ROAA), the average Return on Equity (ROAE), and the Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) as alternative measures of the performance and profitability of banks. 
While challenging the second and third hypotheses, we aimed to determine the main 
drivers of the banks' profitability (proxied by the ROA ratio). Henceforth, annual 
CAMEL ratios were obtained for each bank, when available. Information about own-
ership structure was likewise retrieved from the database. Table 4.1 presents the cho-
sen variables, the particular proxies of CAMEL determinants, together with their 
bankscope code. 







Capital adequacy CA_CAP Capital Adequacy Ratio (4008) 
 AQ_LOSS Loan loss reserve/Gross loans (4001) 
Assets quality AQ_IMP Impaired loans/Equity (4037) 
 
AQ_LLP/NIR Loan loss provisions/Net interest 
revenue 
(4002) 
                                                 
9
 Version lastly updated 16 January 2013. 
10
 Stata/SE ver. 11.2, Gretl ver. 1.9.9 








MA_NIE Total non-interest expense minus 
total non-interest operating in-
come/Total assets 
(UDV1)11 
Ability MA_IE Total interest expense and total 
non-interest expense/Total assets 
(UDV2)12 
Earnings EP_INI Net interest income/Total assets (UDV3)13 
Profitability EP_FEE Net fees and commissions/Total 
assets 
(UDV4)14 
Liquidity LR_LOAN Net loans/Total assets (4032) 
Risk LR_LA Liquid assets/Customer and short 
term funding 
(4035) 
*All variables are expressed in percentage format. 
The selection of such variables (which enter the tested models as explanatory 
variables) has been influenced by the research work of Huang, et al. (Huang, et al., 
2012). The supplementary significant explanation should justify the decision. 
The first determinant, the Capital Adequacy ratio (CA_CAP) is the minimum 
level of capital that all the banks are recommended to maintain according to the 
“Capital Adequacy Framework” set by the Basel Committee. This ratio measures 
bank’s capital expressed as a percentage of its risk-weighted credit exposures. The 
ratio is calculated according to the formula:  
    
              
   
 
Where, 
       – comprises equity capital and free reserves minimum 4%; 
        – includes subordinate debt, revaluation reserves, hybrid debt capital 
instruments and undisclosed reserves and cumulative perpetual pref-
                                                 
11 User defined variable 1:        
           
    
     
12 User defined variable 2:       
           
    
     
13 User defined variable 3:         
     
    
     
14 User defined variable 4:         
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erence shares; 
    – denotes risk weighted assets. 
According to the Basel Framework, the minimum requirement for the 
CA_CAP equals 8%, but with enforcing of new framework BASEL III banks are 
expected to maintain their capital requirements up to 10.5% by 2019. This ratio is 
expected to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable ROAA (and 
similarly with NIM), which according to Ongore and Kusa (2013), signifies that 
banks do not face volatility in their profit due to leverage. In the process of compiling 
the data, we have found that many banks have incomplete or missing information 
about the CA_CAP. Since this ratio is relevant for the analysis of banks' performance 
determinants, we excluded banks, for which CA_CAP was not provided at least one 
time in the period 2007-2011, from the sample used to estimate econometric models.  
 For the Assets Quality (AQ) measures, we selected three ratios. Two of them 
were used as in Huang et al. (2012), the AQ_LOSS and AQ_IMP. The ratio, 
AQ_LLPNIR, was added to substitute for the AQ proxy, when two first determinants 
were missing. Following the explicit explanation found in Bankscope and in Huang et 
al. (2012), the AQ_LOSS, calculated as the ratio of the loan loss reserve over the 
gross loan, refers to loss reserves expressed as percentage of the total loans given. 
The higher the ratio, the worse the quality of the loans, therefore we expect to have a 
negative relationship with the return on assets. Impaired loans expressed as a percent-
age of equity, the AQ_IMP, has the same association with the return on assets. It 
states the weakness of the loans given in rapport to the equity. The last ratio, which 
also represents the assets quality, is the AQ_LLPNIR, calculated as loan loss provi-
sions over net interest revenue. It may be also interpreted as the measure of risk re-
muneration. If the ratio increases, it signals that growing risk is not adequately com-
pensated by higher margins.  
 For the following ratios we have implied same variables as in Huang et al. 
(2012). The management ability is represented by two ratios which are expected to 
have a negative relationship with the ROAA. The first is MA_NIE, calculated as the 
difference between total non-interest expenses and total non-interest operating in-
come over total assets. The second MA_IE is the sum of total interest expenses and 
non-interest expenses over total assets. 
 The earnings profitability consists of the net interest income as a percentage 
of total assets EP_INI and the net fees and commission as a percentage of total assets 
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EP_FEE. Since these ratios describe the earnings which are commodity based and 
routinely, they have a positive relationship with the return to assets ratio. 
 The last CAMEL determinant, the liquidity risk includes the liquidity ratios, 
the LR_LOAN expressed as a percentage of the amount of net loans in rapport to 
total assets, and the LR_LA calculated as the ratio between liquid assets and custom-
er and short-term funding. Since the first ratio tells how much of bank assets are giv-
en for loans, meaning that with its increase a bank becomes less liquid, we expect this 
ratio to have a negative relationship with the ROA ratio. The last ratio measures the 
extent, to which a bank is able to meet its obligations in case of a sudden withdrawal 
from the customers (deposit run-off). The higher the ratio, the more liquid the bank 
is. Consequently, we expect it to have a positive relationship with the ROA as in 
Huang et al. 
4.3 Methodology  
For the first hypothesis, we perform simple comparative analysis of banks' perform-
ance indicators. The relevant methodology has been already described in Section 4.1. 
Below, we specify in more detail the econometric approach employed to analyse in-
ternal drivers of banks’ performance.  
With multiple individual observations for up to five time points, the panel data 
framework was chosen for analysing relationship between banks' profitability and 
CAMEL determinants.  
The benchmark specification is of the form  
                   (1) 
Where, 
Y : 
is the matrix of dependent variables which refers to the yearly return 
on average assets (i.e. profitability) for every bank i at time t; 
α : is the constant, intercept of the regression; 
   : is the vector of coefficients; 
X : 
the matrix of independent variables, the CAMEL ratios – presumably, 
the determinants of the banks' profitability; 
   : the matrix of disturbance terms in the regression equation. 
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For the purpose of our analysis we employ the variables as presented below in (2): 
 
 The choice of particularly these proxies of CAMEL ratios is motivated by 
data availability and preliminary estimations with different sets of variables.  
We start by evaluating the benchmark model using different panel-data ap-
proaches in order to determine whether individual effects are present. Further, the 
model is augmented to allow for the verification of the aforementioned hypotheses. In 
order to test for the ownership effect, we determine whether intercept and slopes are 
jointly varying, by separating the sample based on the ownership dummy and em-
ploying the Chow test. In a similar way, we test the third hypothesis: starting with the 
inclusion and analysis of the time dummies and proceeding with the separate model 
estimation for different periods Pre and Post-Crisis.  
                                                
                                           
                                       
(2) 
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5 Empirical Results  
We comment on all the findings and regression outputs according the hypotheses 
order. Starting from the simple data analysis and hypothesis testing, we continue with 
the CAMEL model, analysing the empirical results in a more comprehensive way. 
5.1 Banks from Highly Affected Countries Performing 
Worse than those from Less Affected Countries 
The division of 27 European countries into two groups is shown in the table below. 
The first group was named as the Less Affected, and the second was named Highly 
Affected. Based on the mean and median calculated from the GDP growth rates aver-
ages of the years 2009 and 2010, we constructed the benchmark in order to divide the 
sample. We obtained -1.97% for the average, and -1.09% for the median. Italy’s av-
erage of annual GDP growth rates resulted above the mean, however we decided to 
group it with the area of Highly Affected countries, because it was below the median. 
Annual real GDP growth rates by country are presented in Table 5.1. Averages of 
three analysed profitability measures for each country can be found in the Appendix 
A: Hypothesis I. 




 Average of annual GDP growth (2009-2010) Average of annual GDP growth (2009-2010) 
    
Austria -0.87 Bulgaria -2.55 
Belgium -0.19 Denmark -2.04 
Cyprus -0.18 Estonia -5.37 
Czech Republic -1.01 Finland -2.61 
France -0.71 Greece -4.04 
Germany -0.48 Hungary -2.77 
Luxembourg -0.58 Ireland -3.11 
Malta 0.03 Italy -1.89 
Netherlands -1.02 Latvia -9.15 
Poland 2.75 Lithuania -6.71 
Portugal -0.49 Romania -4.11 
Slovak Republic -0.37 Slovenia -3.31 
Sweden 0.76 Spain -2.03 
United Kingdom -1.09 
  
    
Average (2009-2010) -0.25 Average (2009-2010) -3.82 
Source: World Bank, author’s computations.  
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Comparing the ROAA 
To visually see the performance of commercial banks from the Less and Highly Af-
fected countries, we have constructed the figure below to show the dynamics of the 
return on average assets ratio for the years 2007 – 2011. Up to the year 2008, it is 
difficult to say that their performance varies. The mean difference is easily seen from 
the year 2009. The ROAA of the BLA countries is visually higher than the ROAA of 
the BHA countries. It can also be noted from the figure that this change starts to nar-
row in the year 2011, unfortunately we do not have the values for the year 2012, to 
see the latest developments. 
 
Figure 5.1: Average trend of ROAA  
Source: author’s computations. 
 
To more accurately test our hypothesis whether during the crisis the banks 
from Highly Affected countries have performed worse in terms of return on average 
assets ratio than those from Less Affected countries during the crisis, we have nar-
rowed our data only for the years 2009 and 2010. Figure 5.2 depicts separate histo-
grams of the average ROAA ratios in 2009 – 2010 for the banks based in the Less 
and Highly Affected countries. It can be seen that the returns of the BHA, unlike 
those of the BLA, are negatively skewed, thus, pointing that the banking sector in the 
Highly Affected countries experienced harsher profitability drops following the fi-
nancial crisis.  
 
Before the statistical test, the data underwent slight transformations. First, 
natural logarithms of the series were taken in order to account for its skewness and 









2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Banks of Less Affected Banks of Highly Affected 
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Since, ROAA are measured in percentages and, moreover, may be negative, the loga-
rithms were taken according to the formula:  
                 
    
   
  
Then, the evident outliers were removed from both samples.  
  
Banks from Less Affected countries Banks from Highly Affected countries 
Figure 5.2: Frequency distributions of ROAA for the two samples 
Source: Bankscope 
From the output table of the test performed, we can see the actual means, 
standard deviations of both variables and number of banks used to perform the test. 
We notice here that the number of banks is slightly smaller because of the omitted 
outliers.  
 
Table 5.2: Two Means t-Test Results (ROAA) 
ROAA, averages for 2009-2010 Banks from LA Banks from HA 
Mean 0.244964 -0.4648925501 
Variance 6.31449 11.403 
St. deviation 2.512864 3.376825468 
Observations 723 356 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 581 
 t Stat 3.51584 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0004384 
 *the test assumed unequal variances of the samples.  
The test statistic computed is t=3.51584. The rejection region t-Critial two tail 
is 2.5843. The computed probability is p=0.0004384 (two tail), or 0.043% which is 
smaller than the value α=1%. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis which means 
that there is a significant difference between the two groups. Looking at the actual 


















Test statistic for normality:



















Test statistic for normality:
Chi-square(2) = 211.194 [0.0000]
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from Highly Affected countries performed worse than those from Less Affected 
countries. Another observation is that the banks from the BHA group are more di-
verse: the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected at 1% confidence level. Addi-
tionally, high variance should be noted for both samples; even though the average 
returns are stacked around 0% for both groups; the spread between the minimum and 
maximum returns is significant: from -22% to 25% for the BLA group and from -
28% to 13.5% for the BHA selection. In this way, further analysis of banks’ perform-
ance is of interest in order to determine the main (internal) factors behind profitabil-
ity. The results of such analysis by the means of an econometric panel-data model, 
that shall also complement the present analysis, are provided in Section 5.2. How-
ever, prior to it, we outline the results of the comparative analysis with the alternative 
performance measures: ROAE and NIM. 
Comparing the ROAE 
In the following figure we see how the return on average equity has decreased since 
2007. The difference of the means is noticeably seen, banks from Highly Affected 
countries had on average negative returns, whilst the banks from Less Affected coun-




Figure 5.3: Average ROAE  
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Similar to the previous section we apply the T-test to significantly test the 
Null hypothesis that banks of HA countries perform the same as the banks from LA 
countries, in terms of ROAE for the average ratios of 2009 and 2010.  
Table 5.3 Two Means t-Test Results (ROAE) 
ROAE, averages for 2009-2010 Banks from LA Banks from HA 
Mean 3.557091413 -2.145528571 
St. deviation 14.866 17.815 
Observations 722 350 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 592 
 t Stat 5.178103238 
 P(T<=t)  3.07626E-07 
 *the test assumed unequal variances of the samples.  
 From the output table test statistic, t=5.1781, is on the rejection region of the 
null hypothesis with level of significance set at 1%. We conclude that there is a sig-
nificant difference in the population means in terms of the return on average equity 
ratio. The actual difference calculated is higher than the ROAA, mainly since the 
ROAE ratios are bigger by construction. Greater variability between the observations 
can be again explained by the spread between the minimum and the maximum val-
ues. High standard deviations point on the significant performance diversity within 
both groups.  
Comparing the NIM 
By the end of 2008, the trend of the Net Interest Margin of banks from both groups in 
average was going similarly upwards. After the year 2008, the financial crisis brought 
changes into the trend flow. From the figure we see that banks from Less Affected 
countries have been hit more in terms of curve declining. It seems that banks from 
Highly Affected countries take the lead on the ratio of net interest income to average 
interest earning assets. However the graph might mislead the visual conclusion, be-
cause it comprises also the outliers (the raw data), which might have affected the re-
sults; therefore we will statistically test the assumption. Prior to the test, the data were 
transformed as the ROAA cross-section.  
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Figure 5.4: Average trend on NIM  
Source: author’s computations.  
Unlike with the two previous performance measures, we could not reject the 
null hypothesis that there is the mean difference amongst the groups at 10% signifi-
cance level.  
Table 5.4: Two Means t-Test Results (NIM) 
NIM, averages for 2009-2010 Banks from LA Banks from HA 
Mean 12.2548 10.4139 
St. deviation 21.4063 17.2022 
Observations 702 349 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 853 
 t Stat 1.50281 
 P(T<=t)  0.1329 
 *the test assumed unequal variances of the samples.  
Such result may suggest that the reported above differences in banks’ performance 
were weakly related to the interest income and the amount of interest paid. Instead, 
other (non – interest) income components were responsible for sharper decrease of 
the ROAA and ROAE ratios of the banks located in the Highly Affected countries. 
The further section aims to investigate in a more sophisticated way other factors that 
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5.2 CAMEL Approach: Preliminary estimations 
We start by estimating the benchmark panel-data model as presented in Sec-
tion 4.3. The original data sample comprises 405 cross-sectional units and 5 time-
periods. The panel is unbalanced because of the missing data for particular banks 
during some years.  
To decide for the concrete model, firstly we have estimated the pooled OLS 
and have tested the Breusch Pagan LM hypothesis, and concluded that the pooled 
OLS regression is inferior to the random-effects model (variance of the individual 
effects is statistically above zero). Next, we run the Hausman test, whose null hy-
pothesis supports both fixed and random-effects results (they are consistent at null 
with the random-effects coefficients being more efficient) and alternate is that ran-
dom-effects estimates are not consistent. Having strongly rejected the null, we con-
cluded that constant individual effects are present. According to such result, the per-
formance/profitability varies across European banks and depends on their internal 
characteristics. Further, we are going to use fixed-effects models for the research 
purpose.  
Another step was to add time dummies to test whether years had any specific 
impact on the dependent variable. We obtained statistically significant time-dummies. 
The greatest decrease of the constant due to time effect (-0.23 percentage points), as 
expected, was observed in 2009 and 2010.  
We have used the robust standard errors option for all conducted regressions, 
in order to yield a more accurate test statistic for our regression output. The summary 
statistics together with all tests that we have run can be found in the Appendix B: Hy-
pothesis II and Appendix C: Hypothesis III. 
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5.3 Ownership Matter 
In this section, using the CAMEL approach, we show the results on how the bank 
specific factors have affected the performance of the 27 EU commercial banks during 
the period of years 2007 – 2011. Furthermore, we will focus on how this performance 
changes between majority foreign-owned banks and those majority domestic banks. 
In the table presented below, we have provided three regression result outputs. 
Table 5.5: Regression output, Ownership Matter 







 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ROAA ROAA ROAA 
    
CA_CAP 0.00356 -0.00070 0.02140 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.020) 
AQ_LLPNIR -0.01051*** -0.00987*** -0.01128*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
AQ_LOSS -0.10231*** -0.14423*** -0.05505 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.045) 
AQ_IMP -0.00440*** -0.00419** -0.00465** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
MA_NIE -0.73086*** -0.76221*** -0.73267*** 
 (0.063) (0.072) (0.126) 
MA_IE -0.13099*** -0.11475*** -0.13083 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.085) 
EP_INI 0.49042*** 0.49702*** 0.54831*** 
 (0.101) (0.119) (0.141) 
EP_FEE 0.08861 0.09340 0.12660 
 (0.079) (0.086) (0.176) 
LR_LOAN -0.01336** -0.01431* -0.00948 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
LR_LA -0.00639 -0.00559 -0.00450 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
2008.PERIOD -0.12370** -0.08625 -0.16191** 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.076) 
2009.PERIOD -0.24222*** -0.23489** -0.24265 
 (0.090) (0.104) (0.163) 
2010.PERIOD -0.23287*** -0.15850 -0.27701* 
 (0.089) (0.117) (0.141) 
2011.PERIOD -0.11922 0.00225 -0.19648 
 (0.103) (0.128) (0.176) 
CONSTANT 1.97897*** 2.16346*** 1.15794 
 (0.495) (0.592) (0.999) 
    
Observations 1,520 703 817 
R-squared Within 0.6801 0.7401 0.6490 
R-squared Between 0.6455 0.7492 0.6604 
R-squared Overall 0.6921 0.7425 0.6726 
Number of Banks 405 185 220 
Sum of Squared Residuals 704.1375 234.4061 458.1270 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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 The first model (1) presents the results for the whole sample of banks. The 
model explains overall about 69% of banks’ profitability variance by their internal 
factors, which are proxied by the CAMEL ratios. The intercept parameter shows that 
the average ROAA of the European commercial banks constitutes about 1.98%. Capi-
tal adequacy ratio (CA_CAP) did not prove to be significant in determining the in-
crease of the returns on assets. From the CAMEL determinants we see that the assets 
quality determinants significantly affect the financial performance of the banks. The 
ratio AQ_IMP (standing for impaired loans as a percentage of equity) and also the 
ratio AQ_LOSS (standing for loan loss reserves as a percentage of total loans) de-
scent the ROAA. A much higher effect on decreasing the financial performance is 
seen on the management ability ratios. The increase of total interest and non-interest 
expenses (MA_NIE) decreased the ROAA to 0.13%, but we see a worse effect at the 
ratio MA_IE (standing for non-interest expenses and non-interest operating income) 
with a significant result of -0.73%. About the earnings profitability determinants, we 
see that the earnings coming from net interest income (EP_INI) increased the ROAA 
for about 0.49% to 1% level of significance. From the liquidity ratios, the LR_LOAN 
(the net loans as a percentage of total assets) proved to significantly affect the ROAA 
at 5% significance level. Whilst the last ratio LR_LA (representing the ability of the 
bank to meet its obligations), did not result significant. The time dummy variables 
proved to be significant except for the year 2011, which may indicate that the average 
profitability in 2011 has returned to the level of 2007.  
 The second (2) and the third (3) models present the regression results for the 
data separated into two groups, the majority foreign-owned group (MFO) and the 
majority domestic-owned (MDO) banks group. From the Chow test we learned that 
there is a structural change with respect to ownership type. The sum of squared resid-
uals for two separate groups was statistically smaller comparing to the one of the full 
dataset.  
We see that the model fits the data better in the majority foreign-owned bank 
group even though there are fewer degrees of freedom. The majority foreign-owned 
banks have a bigger intercept value, meaning that, on average, for a five-year period, 
the MFO banks have performed better compared to the MDO banks. However, the 
intercept for the domestic group was not significant. The ratio AQ_LOSS (loan loss 
reserves in rapport to total loans) and the management’s ability ratio MA_IE (non-
interest expenses and non-interest operating income) were not significant for the do-
mestic bank group, whilst it is the opposite case for the foreign bank group.  
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The time effect was also different between the groups. At majority foreign-
owned banks, only year 2009 features significant drop in the profitability indicator. 
At majority domestic-owned banks the year dummy variable was significant also in 
2008 and 2010, showing that during these years the banks’ return on assets was de-
creasing. Thus, we may infer that the foreign capital had facilitated faster recovery of 
the foreign-owned banks relative to the banks with a dominant share of the domestic 
equity.  
5.4 Structural Time Break during the Crisis Period 
The section presents the results of banks’ performance analysis during the period 
2007-2010. We have already noted the significance of the time dummies for the con-
stant (average ROAA).  In order to complement the findings, we divide the data on 
the Pre-Crisis (2007 – 2008) and Post-Crisis (2009 – 2011) and run separate regres-
sions. We use the Chow test to find out whether there was a structural break with 
respect to time in the financial performance of the banks. Having strongly rejected 
the null hypothesis of the Chow test (Appendix C: Table.1), we prove that there was a 
structural change during the financial crisis. 
To further analyse how commercial banks have performed during this period, 
we divide the dataset into three periods. First period consists of the years 2007 -2008, 
second period comprises observations for the year 2009 and lastly third period em-
ploys data only for the year 2010. We have named the period 2007-2008 as the Pre-
Crisis. We included 2008 in the pre-crisis, because the crisis effect has become ob-
servable in the financial performance of the commercial banks mostly since 2009. We 
omitted the year 2011, because we do not consider it relevant within the scope of the 
present study.  
To have even a more comprehensive analyse we again divide these three pe-
riod samples, according to the ownership structure (MFO and MDO). All Chow test 
results conducted can be found in tables of test summaries in Appendix C: Hypothesis 
III separately for each following period. All regression outputs are shown in the table 
(5.6) below. 
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 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables ROAA ROAA ROAA ROAA ROAA ROAA ROAA ROAA ROAA 
          
CA_CAP -0.00571 -0.01974 0.01148 -0.01527 -0.02778 -0.00754 -0.00577** -0.00430** -0.01944 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013) 
AQ_LLPNIR -0.00731** -0.00655* -0.01169*** -0.00994*** -0.00968*** -0.01111*** -0.02023*** -0.01854*** -0.02007*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
AQ_LOSS -0.30648*** -0.26558** -0.31132*** -0.13788*** -0.20918*** -0.05340** -0.05429**  -0.07131** 
 (0.105) (0.113) (0.103) (0.043) (0.067) (0.025) (0.023)  (0.033) 
AQ_IMP -0.00223** -0.00159* -0.00449* -0.00034 0.00128 -0.00088 -0.00158 -0.00211 -0.00265** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
MA_NIE -0.91529*** -0.91328*** -0.87906*** -0.83293*** -0.93785*** -0.66052*** -0.91418*** -0.97592*** -0.87993*** 
 (0.100) (0.127) (0.142) (0.055) (0.094) (0.078) (0.075) (0.109) (0.103) 
MA_IE -0.10389 -0.13535 -0.08127 0.00711 0.01259 0.08153 -0.04046** -0.01508 -0.04755 
 (0.068) (0.089) (0.063) (0.019) (0.024) (0.053) (0.020) (0.018) (0.037) 
EP_INI 0.62371*** 0.59132*** 0.70227*** 0.53435*** 0.66516*** 0.40785*** 0.59654*** 0.53189*** 0.62087*** 
 (0.121) (0.163) (0.113) (0.054) (0.088) (0.039) (0.050) (0.050) (0.082) 
EP_FEE 0.22383 0.27370 0.03873 0.10235 0.17580 0.12609* -0.02311 -0.08201*** 0.08516 
 (0.183) (0.202) (0.189) (0.093) (0.152) (0.071) (0.050) (0.031) (0.077) 
LR_LOAN -0.01073 -0.00467 -0.01196 -0.00798*** -0.01607*** 0.00113 0.00827* 0.00119 0.01610** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
LR_LA -0.00165 -0.00514 -0.00144 -0.00564** -0.00536** -0.00055 0.00334 0.00012 0.00808 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Constant 1.81387*** 1.73923** 1.75541** 1.48254*** 1.94658*** 0.60739** 0.40431 0.82954*** -0.01966 
 (0.608) (0.874) (0.731) (0.334) (0.535) (0.245) (0.293) (0.235) (0.527) 
          
Observations 551 264 287       
R-squared 0.760 0.724 0.838 0.841 0.842 0.882 0.858 0.858 0.874 
Nr. of banks 321 155 166 317 149 168 330 152 179 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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For the Pre-Crisis period we estimated the fixed-effects model as in the previ-
ous section. The first column, model (4), gives the results for the whole pre-crisis 
sample. We notice here that the number of banks is smaller because information for 
some particular banks was missing for the first years of our research study. However 
the prediction power of the model is satisfying, with R-square equal to 76%. In the 
pre-crisis period the significant intercept shows that, on average, these banks gener-
ated return on assets equal to 1.81%. When testing for structural break with respect to 
foreign ownership, we strongly rejected the null hypothesis, meaning that there is a 
structural change with respect to ownership. The regression outputs can be seen in the 
model (5) and model (6). 
  The CAMEL determinants representing the assets quality were significantly 
negatively correlated with the ROAA. Their effect appeared less important for the 
performance of majority foreign-owned banks. As for the management ability the 
MA_NIE ratio (total interest and non-interest expenses), resulted statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level, with a higher impact on the MFO banks.. Earnings coming from 
net interest income (EP_INI) ratio, have significantly positively affected the ROAA, 
with a higher impact on the MDO banks. Regarding the intercepts we see they are 
almost the same for both bank groups meaning that, on average, among European 
commercial banks there was not much difference in ROAA during favourable eco-
nomic times, in contrast to what was observed during the crisis. Capital adequacy 
ratio did not prove to be significant in any of the cases, a similar result we obtained in 
the second-hypothesis testing. 
 Moving our analysis to the crisis period, we focus now on the regression out-
puts on the same the table (5.6), but now we look for the models (7) till (12). Having 
observations for just one point in time, we have run the simple OLS regression, 
where the same dependent variable was explained by the independent variables of the 
CAMEL determinants. Except for the model (11), we found no problem with multi-
collinearity between independent variables. To solve the problem we removed the 
AQ_LOSS, which resulted in high correlation with AQ_IMP (0.7515). Meanwhile, 
the heteroscedasticity was present; in order to control for it, we estimated robust-error 
regressions. Similarly to the pre-crisis period, we have divided and run the regres-
sions according to ownership structure for years, the 2009 and the 2010. 
Total number of observations for the year 2009 was 317. The model's predic-
tion power was high for all the samples, explaining above 84% variation of the de-
pendent variable. What we can easily detect is that the R-square was higher for the 
MDO banks. We see that for a short period of time, the CAMEL model fits better the 
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data for the MDO banks, additionally this result may support our conclusion that 
MFO banks are less affected by internal factors represented by the CAMEL determi-
nants than the MDO banks. In other words external factors, which we have not con-
sidered in our analysis, are likely to affect more MFO banks than MDO banks.  
In the year 2009, the intercept difference compared to the pre-crisis period 
shows that banks’ performance started to deteriorate, they were having a lower aver-
age ROAA. When we separated the data according to the ownership structure, the 
intercept differed significantly. The majority foreign-owned banks performed better, 
compared to the majority domestic-owned banks and also to the pre-crisis period. 
Similar to the pre-crisis period, the assets quality determinants affected the perform-
ance of commercial banks, except for the AQ_IMP (impaired loans as a percentage of 
equity). The performance of the MFO banks was significantly determined by the li-
quidity risk ratios (LR_LOAN and LR_LA). The earnings profitability ratio EP_INI 
proved to be significant for both bank groups, with a stronger positive effect on 
ROAA for the MFO banks. The EP_FEE ratio (standing for net fees and commis-
sions as the percentage of total assets) was positively correlated with the performance 
of the MDO banks at 10% significance level. The management ability ratio MA_NIE 
(total interest and non-interest expenses) was negatively correlated with the ROAA 
ratio at 1% level of significance. Comparing our overall results to the Pre-Crisis pe-
riod, we see that except for the deterioration of the average ROAA, the liquidity ra-
tios became significant for the MFO banks.  
In the year 2010, we have 330 observations in total. From the first view, we 
see the estimated intercept has decreased even further relative to the pre-crisis years 
and 2009, however, its significance has decreased, thus, signalling that the sample 
has become more heterogeneous. We again separated the data according to the own-
ership structure and tested for structural break with respect to ownership (Chow test 
results in the Appendix C). From the intercept of model (11) and model (12), we see 
how different these banks have performed. Testing further for collinearity between 
independent variables we noted positive high correlation between AQ_LOSS and 
AQ_IMP (0.7516) at the model (11) for MFO banks, so we dropped AQ_LOSS from 
the model. 
In 2010, the MFO banks have visibly had a smaller average of return on assets 
ratio compared to the previous period. The significant intercept of the MFO banks 
compared to all the previous periods was smaller; meaning that on average the 
ROAA was deteriorating. In the MFO banks, the capital adequacy ratio CA_CAP has 
become significant at 5% level, meaning that banks have increased their capital re-
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quirements and it affected the ROAA ratio by a small decrease, keeping other vari-
ables constant. The assets quality determinants (AQ_LLPNIR, AQ_LOSS and 
AQ_IMP) for the MDO banks were negatively related to the ROAA at 1% (respec-
tively 5%) significance level. The AQ_LLPNIR ratio (standing for the ratio between 
the loan loss provisions over the net interest revenue), was also significant with the 
performance of the MFO banks at 1% level. The earnings profitability ratio EP_INI 
(earnings deriving from the net interest income as a percentage of the total assets), 
was significant for both bank groups with a higher impact on the increase of ROAA 
at the MDO banks. Earnings coming from the net fees and commissions ratio 
(EP_FEE) were also significant for the MFO banks. The MA_NIE resulted to be sig-
nificant at 1% level for both groups, with a higher negative impact at the MFO banks. 
The liquidity ratio LR_LOAN (net loans as a percentage of the total assets) was sig-
nificant for the MDO banks at 5% level. Comparing to the year 2009, the assets 
quality determinant AQ_IMP (impaired loans/equity) became again significant for 
the MDO banks. The liquidity risk determinant LR_LOAN in 2010 resulted signifi-
cant showing that increase of net loan as a percentage of total assets determined the 
performance ratio of MDO banks. In 2010, also we see a significant change in the 
MFO banks in the case of earnings profitability becoming significant at 1% level. 
Other explanatory variables were not significant or had an opposite impact at ROAA 
(not in line with the assumptions), which could be because of the crisis period. 
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6 Conclusion  
Using comparative analysis and statistical tests, we checked if banks coming from the 
countries that were less affected by the financial crisis outperform banks originating 
from those highly affected countries. We constructed the null hypothesis on three 
performance/ profitability ratios; the return on assets ROA, the return on equity ratio 
ROE and the net interest margin ratio NIM. The average mean of countries GDP 
growth rate for 2009 – 2010 was used as a benchmark to split the banks into Less 
Affected and High Affected. We strongly rejected the null hypothesis that there was 
no difference in the means of ROA and ROE. Regarding the net interest margin we 
could not reject the hypothesis even at 10% confidence level suggesting that both 
groups had same profitability efficiency ratio.  
This study also applied empirical model to comprehensively analyse the per-
formance of commercial banks, using the bank internal factors as explanatory vari-
ables, specifically the CAMEL determinants. The motivation behind the econometric 
methodology approach, has derived from several recent working papers analysing 
and comparing the banking sector in Taiwan, Kenya and India (Huang, et al., 2012) 
(Ongore & Kusa, 2013) (Sangmi & Nazir, 2010). 
We run the panel data models using unbalanced data in pursuit of explaining 
the performance of the independent variable ROAA (return on average assets). We 
equated the dummy variable to 1 for banks that are majority foreign-owned, and to 0 
for otherwise (banks that are majority domestic-owned), with the objective to study 
the ownership implication on the dependent variable ROAA. 
Fixed-effects panel-data model provided the best-fit for the data, thus, indicat-
ing that the profitability is varying across the banks and is, in large, determined by 
individual internal factors. Assets quality, management ability, and interest earnings 
ratios came out as strongly significant for the banks' profitability; importance of li-
quidity (proxied as a ratio of net loans to assets) was likewise significant, but with 
somewhat higher uncertainty. Capital adequacy and income from fees and commis-
sions were not proven to be statistically significant for the ROAA. A structural break 
in the relationship was observed owning to the ownership structure. Assets quality 
indicators were more important for the banks with majority foreign ownership, while 
interest earnings turned out to make a higher contribution to the ROAA of the domes-
tic-capitalized banks. The time dummy variable resulted significant for the year 2009 
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for MFO banks, and in 2008 and 2010 for MDO banks, suggesting so different time 
break periods. Having also conducted the Chow test, we proved our claim that there 
was a structural change in banks’ performance during the crisis period. For a more 
comprehensive analysis, we had divided the data according to the years and also ac-
cording to the ownership structure. The crisis period was analysed separately for the 
years 2009 and 2010, conducting a simple OLS regression on cross sectional data.  
Below we briefly conclude how each of the employed CAMEL determinants 
performed in the estimated models. 
Capital Adequacy 
The capital adequacy ratio (CA_CAP) was not a significant determinant of the per-
formance of commercial banks, except for the MFO banks in the year 2010 at the 5% 
level, where it had a negative relationship with the dependent variable. It could be 
attributed to the fact, that banks started increasing their level of capital requirements, 
in order to meet the BASEL III directives, and to have enough capital to sustain oper-
ating losses, as Huang et al (Huang, et al., 2012) suggest.  
Assets Quality 
In the pre-crisis period, all determinants of the assets quality were negatively corre-
lated with the ROAA. The negative impact was more visible for the MDO banks, 
meaning that their profitability was more sensitive to the quality of assets. Only in 
2009, the net loans expressed as a percentage of total assets (AQ_LOSS) were affect-
ing more strongly the performance ratio of the MFO banks. The impaired loans ex-
pressed as a percentage of equity (or the bad loans) (AQ_IMP) proved to be signifi-
cantly negatively correlated with the ROAA only for the MDO banks in 2010. 
Management Ability 
The management ability ratio (MA_NIE), calculated as the difference between total 
non-interest expenses and total non-interest operating income over the total assets, 
proved to be significantly negatively correlated with the ROAA for the whole periods 
(that is: Pre-Crisis, year 2009 and year 2010). The performance of the MFO banks 
was more susceptible to the management ability changes compared to the banks with 
more domestic capital. The second ratio, the MA_IE was not significant.  
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Earnings Profitability 
The only profitability ratio which proved to be significantly and positively correlated 
with the ROAA for the whole period is the EP_INI. This ratio described the return on 
average assets to a certain value. The second ratio EP_FEE (representing earnings 
coming from net fees and commission as a percentage of total assets) proved to be 
positively correlated to the ROAA at 1% level in 2009 for the MDO banks.  
Liquidity Risk 
In the pre-crisis period, the liquidity risk ratios did not prove to be significantly corre-
lated with the dependent variable. The first ratio LR_LOAN representing net loans 
was negatively correlated at the 1% level in 2009 in the MFO banks, whilst was not 
significant for MDO banks. The opposite was seen in 2010, where at the 5% signifi-
cance level, this ratio was positively correlated with the ROAA (which is not in line 
with the assumption, maybe due the crisis effect which was deteriorating the per-
formance of MDO banks). The second ratio was at the 5% significance level nega-
tively correlated with the ROAA in 2009 for the MFO banks. 
Moreover, our results show that in the Pre-Crisis period, on average the 
ROAA was similar for both bank groups. The deterioration of the intercept was more 
vivid on the MDO banks in 2009; whereas the MFO banks the crisis affect was seen 
more in 2010. Both years, the MFO banks had slighter higher ROAA value. This 
study should not end here. A further research is recommended. In the absence of 
time, the CAMEL model in the present thesis was not employed separately for each 
country of the European Union, therefore a similar approach is suggested. Moreover 
we suggest adding to the list: the highly developed European countries, members of 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and also countries which are possible future 
EU candidates and members, particularly countries assigned for the Central Eastern 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
15
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 EFTA members: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein. CEFTA members: Albania, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and the new member Kosovo. 
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Appendix A: Hypothesis I Table.1: The average performance ratios of banks according to countries for the years 2007-2011. 
Less Affected Countries       Highly Affected Countries     
 
Total Number of Banks ROAA ROAE NIM 
 
Total Number of Banks ROAA ROAE NIM 
          
Austria 74 -0.1463 2.9187 2.1748 Bulgaria 22 0.9710 8.3468 4.4643 
Belgium 33 0.3346 5.1770 1.8422 Denmark 42 -0.1639 -1.3307 48.5469 
Cyprus 19 0.4762 9.3827 3.0809 Estonia 7 0.2638 0.0373 67.0267 
Czech Republic 19 0.8213 14.3511 2.7666 Spain 56 0.6024 4.4710 1.7425 
France 126 0.5039 4.5352 21.9270 Finland 10 0.4503 6.9035 11.8478 
Germany 129 0.9887 8.5514 16.4267 Greece 15 -1.7984 -38.9583 75.0114 
United Kingdom 139 0.1829 2.2724 43.1516 Hungary 29 -0.1950 -0.8227 4.9652 
Luxembourg 71 0.6506 9.5266 1.1164 Ireland 14 -1.0883 -21.8545 1.4117 
Malta 9 -4.0839 -1.0039 2.7311 Italy 94 0.4914 4.6987 2.5873 
Netherlands 35 1.2467 5.0516 2.1310 Latvia 12 -0.1600 39.5929 2.4331 
Poland 49 0.2923 5.2192 3.6412 Lithuania 23 -0.8120 -13.3924 2.5090 
Portugal 26 0.2085 3.3423 2.5864 Romania 26 -4.6434 -2.9021 4.3253 
Slovak Republic 23 1.2096 11.2673 3.3794 Slovenia 18 0.3411 2.6024 2.3586 
Sweden 13 0.4793 3.8767 3.0018           
          
Grand Total 765 0.2260 6.0334 7.8541 Grand Total 368 -0.4416 -0.9698 17.6331 
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CA_CAP % 1 
           
AQ_LOSS % 0.0072 1 
          
AQ_IMP % -0.1538 0.5251 1 
         
MA_NIE % 0.1786 0.1634 0.1293 1 
        
MA_IE % -0.3975 -0.1030 -0.0135 -0.2987 1 
       
EP_INI % 0.0157 0.3006 0.1135 0.3302 -0.1891 1 
      
EP_FEE % 0.1698 0.0190 -0.0946 -0.1736 -0.3820 -0.0201 1 
     
LR_LOAN % -0.2610 0.0310 0.2035 0.1127 0.1334 0.3308 -0.1036 1 
    
LR_LA % 0.4079 -0.0457 -0.1525 -0.1045 -0.1691 -0.0642 0.3324 -0.4774 1 
   
AQ_LLP/NIR% -0.0301 0.3883 0.5349 0.0189 -0.0666 0.0395 0.0595 0.1073 -0.1910 1 
  
ROAA % -0.1028 -0.4166 -0.4995 -0.6553 0.1090 0.1052 0.4567 -0.0051 0.2434 -0.4334 1 
 
FO 0.0219 -0.0184 -0.0023 -0.0153 0.0503 -0.0104 0.0090 -0.0978 0.0558 -0.0155 0.0263 1 
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Appendix B: Hypothesis II Table.2: Panel Data Summary 
Variable 
 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Observations 








0 34920.58 34920.58 T =       5 








1.356 2006.693 2011.359 T =  4.5148 








9.439 -78.57137 230.1146 T-bar = 3.81579 








2.895 -13.14051 26.89949 T-bar =  4.1002 








55.657 -341.8706 734.6014 T-bar = 3.93925 








1.693 -24.69645 33.96055 T = 4.51151 








4.391 -172.1362 46.24383 T-bar =  4.4802 








0.858 -15.98822 14.51778 T = 4.50493 








1.152 -17.23552 36.46448 T-bar =  4.4934 








7.085 -9.69666 122.4673 T-bar = 4.51485 








28.422 -473.7378 671.4602 T-bar = 4.49587 








60.379 -785.6952 770.9448 T-bar = 4.40102 








1.866 -25.57036 25.92964 T = 4.51316 




0.499 0 1 n =     608 
 within  0 0.4688 0.4688 T =       5 
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Appendix B: Hypothesis II Table.3: Tests Summaries 
 
Breusch Pagan test, full sample: 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
ROAA[index,t] = Xb + u[index] + e[index,t] 
Estimated results: 
 Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
ROAA 3.2235250 1.7954180 
e .6445941        .8028662 
u .0769447         .2773890 
 
Test:   Var(u)  = 0 
chibar2(01)  = 0.41 




Hausman test, full sample: 
 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
ca_cap .002386 -.0047351 .0071211 .0036942 
aq_llpnir -.0108251 -.0115883 .0007631 .0002686 
aq_loss -.1055776 -.0436914 -.0618861 .0094735 
aq_imp -.0044665 -.0038035 -.0006629 .0003628 
ma_nie -.7174054 -.8736048 .1561994 .0293865 
ma_ie -.1105019 -.0213875 -.0891145 .0177325 
ep_ini .4958652 .5714841 -.0756189 .0458446 
ep_fee .1119085 .0047401 .1071684 .0530651 
lr_loan -.0150767 -.0027824 -.0122943 .0042123 
lr_la -.0064169 -.0046997 -.0017172 .0008328 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 = 134.31 
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Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (405) = 1.3e+34 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Chow test, full sample: 
 
Chow test for structural difference with respect to FO 
F(15, 1490) = 3.64445 with p-value 0.0000 
 
Hausman test, Majority Foreign-owned banks: 
 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
ca_cap -0.00028 -0.0057 0.005428 0.003256 
aq_llpnir -0.01045 -0.01076 0.000305 0.000234 
aq_loss -0.14411 -0.11243 -0.03167 0.007211 
aq_imp -0.00408 -0.0029 -0.00117 0.000339 
ma_nie -0.74811 -0.91289 0.16478 0.036229 
ma_ie -0.1089 -0.02577 -0.08313 0.018086 
ep_ini 0.489894 0.618194 -0.1283 0.063617 
ep_fee 0.104876 0.033354 0.071522 0.045597 
lr_loan -0.01563 -0.00597 -0.00965 0.005305 
lr_la -0.0061 -0.00533 -0.00077 0.000663 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(10)  = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 = 97.41 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (405) = 1.8e+34 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Hausman test, Majority Domestic-owned banks: 
 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
ca_cap 0.015573 -0.00508 0.020652 0.010755 
aq_llpnir -0.01144 -0.01213 0.000692 0.000478 
aq_loss -0.05675 -0.01823 -0.03852 0.017708 
aq_imp -0.00493 -0.00365 -0.00129 0.000676 
ma_nie -0.71037 -0.83061 0.120241 0.048287 
ma_ie -0.10277 -0.01827 -0.0845 0.035155 
ep_ini 0.563223 0.55378 0.009443 0.067965 
ep_fee 0.195344 0.007954 0.187391 0.158189 
lr_loan -0.01059 0.003388 -0.01398 0.007859 
lr_la -0.00314 0.001022 -0.00417 0.004075 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 = 36.47 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 




Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (405) = 5.9e+33 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Appendix C: Hypothesis III Table.1: Test for Structural Time-Break 
 
Chow test, full sample: 
 
Chow test for structural difference with respect to Pre-Crisis 
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Hausman test, full sample, Pre-Crisis period: 
 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
ca_cap -0.00571 -0.00642 0.000709 0.008898 
aq_llpnir -0.00731 -0.01254 0.005231 0.000912 
aq_loss -0.30648 -0.15314 -0.15334 0.038951 
aq_imp -0.00223 -0.00047 -0.00176 0.000669 
ma_nie -0.91529 -0.98188 0.066594 0.049913 
ma_ie -0.10389 -0.08342 -0.02047 0.034401 
ep_ini 0.623712 0.731827 -0.10811 0.093138 
ep_fee 0.223828 -0.08469 0.308523 0.132201 
lr_loan -0.01073 -0.00245 -0.00828 0.00657 
lr_la -0.00165 -0.00039 -0.00126 0.002673 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 48.47 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (405) = 1.4e+34 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Chow test, full sample: 
 
Chow test for structural difference with respect to FO 
Chi-square(11) = 21.8738 with p-value 0.0254 
F(11, 529) = 6.27342 with p-value 0.0275 
 
Hausman test, Majority Foreign-owned banks, Pre-Crisis period: 
 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
 
 
(b) (B) (b-B) 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
ca_cap -0.01974 -0.00988 -0.00986 0.012796 
aq_llpnir -0.00655 -0.00984 0.003294 0.001024 
aq_loss -0.26558 -0.19182 -0.07376 0.052046 
aq_imp -0.00159 -1.9E-05 -0.00157 0.000864 
ma_nie -0.91328 -0.93983 0.026548 0.094467 
ma_ie -0.13535 -0.11493 -0.02042 0.048249 
ep_ini 0.591319 0.732358 -0.14104 0.124297 
ep_fee 0.2737 -0.10268 0.376385 0.191845 
lr_loan -0.00467 -0.00405 -0.00062 0.012009 
lr_la -0.00514 -0.00103 -0.00411 0.003932 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 21.63 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0171 
 
 




Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
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chi2 (405) = 1.1e+34 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Hausman test, Majority Domestic-owned banks, Pre-Crisis period: 
 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
ca_cap 0.011476 0.005552 0.005924 0.012328 
aq_llpnir -0.01169 -0.02119 0.0095 0.002868 
aq_loss -0.31132 -0.01647 -0.29485 0.074702 
aq_imp -0.00449 -0.0019 -0.00259 0.001606 
ma_nie -0.87906 -0.9775 0.098438 0.050263 
ma_ie -0.08127 -0.037 -0.04426 0.054588 
ep_ini 0.702269 0.672975 0.029295 0.145468 
ep_fee 0.038733 -0.06857 0.107308 0.189125 
lr_loan -0.01196 0.000608 -0.01257 0.008889 
lr_la -0.00144 0.00072 -0.00216 0.003863 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 26.58 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0030 
 
 




Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (405) = 9.0e+33 
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Appendix C: Hypothesis III Table.3: Tests Summaries, year 2009 
 
Multicollinearity check, full sample, year 2009: 
 
 
. estat vif 
variance inflation factor 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
aq_loss 2.57 0.38902 
aq_imp 2.24 0.447102 
aq_llpnir 2.1 0.476429 
ep_ini 1.9 0.525888 
lr_la 1.67 0.598329 
ma_ie 1.49 0.67133 
lr_loan 1.47 0.680961 
ep_fee 1.36 0.736839 
ca_cap 1.26 0.795248 
ma_nie 1.24 0.808767 




Heteroscedasticity test, full sample, year 2009: 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ROAA 
chi2(1) = 140.30 




Chow test for structural difference with respect to FO 
 Chi-square(11) = 25.7793 with p-value 0.0070 
 F-form: F(11, 295) = 2.34357 with p-value 0.0089 
 
Multicollinearity check, Majority Foreign-owned banks, year 2009: 
 
 
. estat vif 
variance inflation factor 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
aq_loss 2.58 0.387166 
aq_imp 2.22 0.449464 
lr_la 2.06 0.485607 
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ep_ini 2.04 0.489684 
aq_llpnir 2 0.500155 
lr_loan 1.64 0.610726 
ma_ie 1.37 0.730959 
ep_fee 1.34 0.747748 
ca_cap 1.28 0.784291 
ma_nie 1.17 0.85582 




Heteroscedasticity test, Majority Foreign-owned banks, year 2009: 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ROAA 
chi2(1) = 65.93 




Multicollinearity check, Majority Domestic-owned banks, year 2009: 
 
 
. estat vif 
variance inflation factor 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
aq_loss 2.79 0.358575 
ma_ie 2.66 0.375904 
aq_llpnir 2.65 0.377256 
aq_imp 2.47 0.405601 
ma_nie 2.22 0.449495 
lr_loan 2.17 0.460841 
ep_ini 2.09 0.479069 
lr_la 1.91 0.52228 
ep_fee 1.91 0.52271 
ca_cap 1.3 0.769849 




Heteroscedasticity test, Majority Domestic-owned banks, year 2009: 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
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         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ROAA 
chi2(1) = 44.02 





Appendix C: Hypothesis III Table.4: Tests Summaries, year 2010 
 
Multicollinearity check, full sample, year 2010: 
 
 
. estat vif 
variance inflation factor 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
aq_loss 3.79 0.263831 
aq_imp 2.65 0.377689 
ep_ini 2.56 0.390911 
aq_llpnir 2.32 0.430654 
ma_nie 2.04 0.489614 
lr_loan 1.97 0.506346 
lr_la 1.84 0.542209 
ep_fee 1.59 0.628772 
ma_ie 1.59 0.62956 
ca_cap 1.08 0.929078 




Heteroscedasticity test, full sample, year 2010: 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ROAA 
chi2(1) = 1309.05 




Chow test for structural difference with respect to FO 
 Chi-square(11) = 15.4332 with p-value 0.1635 
 F-form: F(11, 308) = 1.40302 with p-value 0.1701 
 
Multicollinearity check, Majority Foreign-owned banks, year 2010: 
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. estat vif 
variance inflation factor 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
aq_lossa 5 0.199939 
aq_imp 3.19 0.313809 
ep_ini 2.54 0.393647 
aq_llpnir 2.16 0.46366 
lr_loan 2.13 0.469225 
lr_la 1.72 0.582462 
ep_fee 1.61 0.622307 
ma_nie 1.57 0.635237 
ma_ie 1.48 0.676889 
ca_cap 1.1 0.912923 
Mean VIF 2.25  
 
a
VIF – is high, corr(aq_loss| aq_imp)=0.7516, therefore we drop aq_loss 
 
Heteroscedasticity test, Majority Foreign-owned banks, year 2010: 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ROAA 
chi2(1) = 178.62 




Multicollinearity check, Majority Domestic-owned banks, year 2010: 
 
 
. estat vif 
variance inflation factor 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
aq_loss 3.5 0.285859 
ep_ini 3.12 0.320052 
ma_nie 3.01 0.331754 
aq_llpnir 2.77 0.361582 
aq_imp 2.68 0.373333 
lr_loan 2.24 0.446879 
lr_la 2.2 0.453849 
ma_ie 1.87 0.534723 
ep_fee 1.66 0.603518 
ca_cap 1.19 0.840454 
Mean VIF 2.42  




Heteroscedasticity test, Majority Domestic-owned banks, year 2010: 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ROAA 
chi2(1) = 635.54 
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